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Abstract: We examine behavior in the Michigan fluid milk market.  Over-order premiums exist
because fluid milk demands are inelastic. Collusion by cooperatives is required to realize these
profits.  In absence of collusion, the minimum prices defined by federal milk marketing orders
prevails as excess fluid milk is always present.  Proprietary firms in Michigan joined the fluid
milk cartel because of the threat of a state marketing order.  Proprietary firms profits may be
increased and information gathered in the short run through price wars that result when behavior
deviates from collusion.1
Over-order Premiums and Price Wars in the Michigan Milk Market
Policies define minimum milk prices based on end-use in most U.S. markets.  However, fluid
milk prices are often above these minimums.  Cooperative associations operate in the dairy
industry, where 82 percent of the milk is marketed through cooperatives.  Important to
generating over-order premiums, the Capper-Volstead Act allows the formation of marketing
agencies-in-common which coordinate price conduct within commodity markets.  These
associations collude to bargain for over-order premiums, an amount extracted from milk buyers
above federally regulated minimum prices.  Since 1956, cooperatives and proprietary milk
processing firms have extracted over-order premiums through marketing agency-in-common, a
form of cartel agreement, now known as the Producers’ Equalization Committee (PEC).
The existence of over-order premiums is not widely understood.  Their existence depends
crucially on the inelasticity of fluid milk relative to manufactured dairy products, cooperative
market power, successful collusion by cooperatives cartels, and the information provided by
federal milk marketing orders.
The PEC is a form of price-fixing cartel which redistributes cartel rents between its
members.  Economic theory suggests that, in general, price-fixing cartel agreements are not
stable as participating firms have the incentive to deviate from the agreement and drive prices to
competitive levels.  Since 1980, the PEC has experienced three price wars where at least one
participating firm deviated from the cartel agreement.  After each price war, the PEC has re-
grouped and continued operation.  The PEC most recently experienced a price war from
September 1997 through April 1998, when proprietary firms stopped pooling collected premiums
and withheld $3.5 million in fluid premiums from the PEC.2
We examine the existence of over-order premiums in milk markets, assess the cause of
recent PEC price wars, and explain the participation of proprietary firms in the PEC.
Mechanics and the Existence of Over-order Premiums
Dairy farmers historically had limited bargaining power because milk is harvested daily
and is perishable in its raw form.  Proprietary milk processing firms controlled price negotiations
and offered relatively low uniform milk prices, regardless of end-use to all producers.  To
stabilize and improve this market environment, dairy producers organized marketing
cooperatives and lobbied for policies to counter the market power of proprietary firms.  The
result was federal milk marketing orders that require all milk processors pay at least minimum
class prices for milk based on end-use.  Federal orders also pool market revenues across classes
and pay an average price to all dairy producers.  Through classified pricing institutionalized into
federal orders, the rents captured by price discrimination are transferred to the farm level.
The Michigan fluid milk market has three significant participants, two cooperatives and a
proprietary firm.  The two cooperatives can be characterized as a bargaining and a balancing
cooperative.  Modeled in aggregate, the Michigan bargaining cooperatives, denoted Cooperative
B, concentrate on collective bargaining functions and securing a high fluid utilization.  The
balancing or manufacturing cooperative, Cooperative M, performs the functions of the
bargaining cooperative and also operates facilities to convert excess market fluid production into
manufactured dairy products.  Proprietary firms are also grouped together into one representative
firm, Firm P.
In 1998, Cooperative B marketed approximately 19 percent, Cooperative M 65 percent,
and Firm P 16 percent of total milk production.  These proportions are different for the fluid
market where Cooperative B controlled approximately 27 percent, Cooperative M 44 percent,3
and Firm P 29 percent.  The resulting firm-level fluid utilizations are 69 percent for Cooperative
B, 32 percent for Cooperative M, and 90 percent for Firm P.  Fluid premiums are pooled across
all milk so net cartel member revenue is inversely related to firm-level fluid utilization.
Figure 1 depicts the operation of the Michigan milk market using market information
from May 1997 (prices in December 1998 dollars).  The demand curves,  f D , and  m D , represent
the demand for fluid and manufacturing milk.  Fluid demand is inelastic reflecting the
perishability and local scope of the market.  The demand for manufacturing milk is perfectly
elastic as the products are storable and the market is national in scope.
The May 1997 minimum federal order fluid price, 
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f P was $19.82/cwt.  In the absence
of the fluid milk cartel, the market fluid price equals the minimum federal order fluid price as
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The PEC collects a fluid premium by setting the fluid price above the federal order
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 Figure 1. Michigan Milk Market, May 1997
The arrows in Figure 1 indicate the PEC over-order effects on the Michigan milk market.
These effects include a decrease in fluid sales, an increase in total milk production, and an
increase in total market revenue.  That is, the total revenue generated by the product of the cartel
blend price and cartel output is greater than the product of the competitive blend price and
competitive output because demand for fluid milk is sufficiently inelastic.  Specifically,
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* * , as the increase in total market revenue offsets the increasing weight of a
higher manufacturing utilization under the cartel situation.
Figure 2 displays the PEC fluid premium on a per hundredweight basis in constant
December 1998 dollars.  Premiums range from a high of $2.89 in December 1990, to a low of











25 75 125 175 225 275 325 375 425





























Figure 2. PEC Premium, May 1980-December 1998 (Dec. 1998 Dollars)
Price Wars, Agreements, and Payoffs
The benefits to milk marketing organizations of forming and operating an over-order
cartel are obvious.  However, not all industry organizations have participated in the PEC, and at
times some firms have opted to not cooperate and instigate a price war rather than collect and
pool these over-order premiums.
Price wars occur any time at least one PEC member deviates from the cartel agreement.
Upon such an action, the cartel stops pooling fluid premiums and often stops collecting these
premiums.  This does not necessarily mean that cartel members do not tacitly collude, or extract
over-order premiums individually.  Rather, a price war means that the PEC does not jointly pool
and transfer premiums to all of the previous PEC members.
Cartel members may initiate a price war to increase short-run revenues, alter distribution
of cartel rents, change membership, or change negotiation position.  Since 1980, three price wars
























resulted in a structural change to the PEC agreement which includes provisions for collecting,
pooling, and transferring cartel rents between members, as well as delineating governance of the
cartel.
Table 1 summarizes these price wars in terms of the initial drop of the fluid premium,
minimum fluid premium, duration, market revenue foregone, initial cause, and PEC results.
Market revenue foregone was calculated using a fixed fluid premium of $1.00 per
hundredweight, the typical long-run premium (inflated to constant December 1998 dollars).
Fluid quantities were estimated using average monthly utilization and total production.
Table 1. Characteristics of PEC Price Wars
PEC Price War 1982 1992 1997
Initial Premium Drop $0.61 $1.18 $0.22
Minimum Premium $0.00 $0.00 $0.78
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The PEC agreement specifies the mechanics that transfer collected premiums between
PEC members.  Traditionally, Firm P and Cooperative B have a negative balance with the PEC,
or pay into the PEC, as they have a high fluid utilization.  Conversely, Cooperative M usually
has a positive balance with the PEC, or receives payment from the PEC, because the PEC pools
fluid premiums over total market milk.  Therefore, Cooperative M with a lower fluid utilization
than Cooperative B and Firm P, receives payments from the other PEC members to compensate
it for a low fluid utilization.  This net pay situation has caused strife between cartel members and7
contributed to the three price wars between 1980 and 1998.  In 1982, Cooperative B withdrew
from the cartel in November because it felt it was subsidizing Cooperative M and being
penalized for its high fluid utilization.  The 1982 price war lasted almost three years until the
PEC reformed in July 1985 without changing the distribution of the cartel rents.  Cooperative B
returned to the PEC as the payoffs from the PEC were greater than what it could generate
independently in a market without fluid premiums.  In June 1992, Cooperative B again
terminated the PEC agreement for six months.  The cartel resumed operation in December 1992
after cartel members agreed to alter the pooling mechanism.  Perhaps the most important change
following the 1992 price war was that Firm P joined the cartel.  Most recently, the cartel
collapsed in September 1997 when Firm P exited the PEC but rejoined in May 1998 because of a
percieved policy threat.
Table 2 reports net payoffs on a per hundredweight basis under the three PEC agreements
(May 1980 – December 1998).  The payoffs are calculated under each agreement using May
1998 quantities while price are expressed in December 1998 dollars.  Note that the pooling
mechanism did not change as a result of the 1982 price war, and thus payoffs in the first two
columns of Table 2 are identical.
Table 2 PEC Net Payoffs ($/cwt) Calculated Under Different PEC Agreements for May










Firm P 1.23 1.23 0.77 0.85
Cooperative B 0.51 0.51 0.58 0.64
Cooperative M 0.52 0.52 0.62 0.58
Many theories, usually involving explicit market conditions, exist to explain the cause of
cartel price wars.  However, Levenstein suggests bargaining price wars occur when a cartel
member violates a cartel agreement to gain a more favorable distribution of the rents.  This firm8
instigates a bargaining price war to force the cartel to negotiate a new equilibrium with a more
favorable rent distribution.  The price war changes firm expectations and moves the industry to a
new equilibrium with a different rent distribution.
The 1982 and 1992 PEC price wars were bargaining price wars involving Cooperative B
and Cooperative M.  In both instances, Cooperative B attempted to change the distribution of the
rents.  Cooperative B was unsuccessful in 1982 but was successful in 1992.  The Price War of
1997 appears to be a bargaining price war, but upon further review, Firm P had motivation
beyond simply altering the distribution of the rents.  Explaining the 1997 price war requires an
understanding of Firm P’s voluntary participation in the PEC cartel.  In fact, participation by
Firm P is surprising as they were able to free-ride on the PEC over-order premiums from 1956 to
1992.  We focus our analysis by explaining Firm P’s decision to join using cooperative game
theory.
Participation by Proprietary Firms
Since 1980, Firm P’s fluid market share had steadily increased from about 10 percent or
about 15 million pounds of fluid sales per month, to approximately 20 percent representing 30
million pounds of monthly fluid sales.  During this period, the existing PEC members,
Cooperative B and Cooperative M, were losing market share, income, and membership to Firm P
which was free-riding on the PEC over-order premiums.  This loss motivated an effort to force
Firm P into the PEC through a state order which would formalize and institutionalize the PEC to
include all Michigan fluid milk.  The potential effect of proprietary firm fluid milk was
significant to the PEC.  For example, in January 1992 Firm P’s participation in the PEC would
have increased revenues by $362,700.9
To model the decision faced by Firm P, a two-player cooperative game is utilized.  In the
game, the players are Firm P and the existing PEC cartel consisting of Cooperative B and
Cooperative M.  Players form coalitions if and only if the expected payoff to each member is
greater than that player’s security level, the payoff a player receives outside the coalition.
Therefore, assessing Firm P’s conduct requires a comparison of Firm P’s PEC payoffs to its
security level.
With a fluid utilization of over 90 percent, if Firm P joins the PEC it transfers a
significant portion of its premiums to other PEC members which have lower utilization.  If Firm
P remains outside the PEC, it might reasonably expect to free-ride on the PEC’s fluid price and
retain premiums as was the case from 1956-1992.  Outside the PEC, Firm P’s security level,  P v ,
is the product of the PEC fluid premium,ρ , and its monthly fluid sales, 
P
f Q .  Formally, this
security level may be expressed as:
(1)  ( )() ρ
P
f P Q v = .
If Firm P joins the PEC, it transfers a portion of the premium to the PEC, 
P S , which
results in fluid payoffs,  P π , of:
(2)  ( )()
P P
f P S Q − = ρ π .
Firm P joins the PEC in any period if and only if its payoff,  P π , is greater than its
security level,  P v .  Because 
P S  > 0, then  P P v < π , and Firm P rationally remains outside the
PEC.
However, Firm P joined the PEC in December 1992.  Since this decision is irrational in
the above game, that characterization is not complete.  Specifically, we have not accounted for
the credible threat to profits in the form of a potential state marketing order discussed above.  A10
state marketing order would make Firm P profits expressed in (2) permanent as the current PEC
agreement is not strictly binding law and therefore temporary.  Whereas under the current
agreement, Firm P deviations to achieve profits from (1) are possible.
Under a state order Firm P profits are:
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where this condition holds forever.
In contrast, when Firm P voluntarily joins the PEC, profits are:
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where the first term represents profits during periods of collusion, i, equal to profits under the





p π π > so the rational decision under threat of a state order is voluntary participation
in the PEC.
Of course, the decision is not quite this simple.  The state order is not a sure thing.
Deviation from the voluntary agreement increases the probability of a state order. Generally, this
probability is a function of legislative leadership, political prowess of Michigan cooperatives,
public opinion, who holds the governor’s office, and many other factors.  During periods when
Firm P deviates, j, they realize profits expressed in (1).  This deviation, or price war, results in
increased lobbying effort by the Cooperatives increasing the probability of a state marketing
order.  When the probability of a state order, and thus the potential that profits will be limited to
(3) forever, reaches a critical level, Firm P voluntarily returns to the PEC.  If the probability of a
state order is low, Firm P rationally remains independent from the PEC.  In this way, Firm P’s11
deviation provides both added profits and information about the probability of a state order to
Firm P.
Using this framework, recent conduct of Firm P is easily explained, including the 1997
price war.  In 1992, the two Michigan cooperatives were close to receiving legislative approval
for a state order.  This resulted in Firm P’s voluntary participation in the PEC.  Realizing that
higher profits existed outside the PEC and desiring new information to re-estimate the
probability of a state order, Firm P exited the PEC in September 1997.  As discussed, Firm P
observed the reaction by the cooperatives and state government and formed a new expectation of
the state order feasibility.  In the spring of 1998, Michigan cooperatives were moving forward
with a proposed state order and Firm P voluntarily returned to the fluid cartel agreement.
Conclusions
We examine behavior in the Michigan fluid milk market.  Over-order premiums exist
because fluid milk demands are inelastic.  The fluid premium is worth around $20.4 million
annually to Michigan farmers.  Collusion by cooperatives is required to realize these profits.
This collusion is allowed under legislation that grants limited anti-trust exemptions to
agricultural cooperatives.  In absence of collusion, the minimum prices defined by federal milk
marketing orders prevails as excess fluid milk is always present.
The distribution of fluid rents has historically been contentious in Michigan resulting in
three price wars since 1980.  Price wars result in new bargaining positions.  Proprietary firms in
Michigan joined the fluid milk cartel because of the threat of a state marketing order.  Joining the
fluid cartel is rational only under the threat of the state-order.  Proprietary firms profits may be
increased and information gathered in the short run through price wars that result when behavior
deviates from collusion.12
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